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STATEMENT OF SUBJECT MATTER AND APPELLATE JURISDICTION

Appeal, instant, of decision of a Habeas Corpus, comes before the Utah
Supreme Court by way Appeal by right; and, by jurisdictional authority
pursuant

to Utah

Subparagraph(s)

Codes

Annotated,

Title

78, Chapter

2,

Section

2,

(3)(j); and by, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule

42; and by assignment from the Utah Court of Appeals.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Whether

trial

sufficiency
factual

court,

by

of Petition

findings

applying

incorrect

for Writ of Habeas

and

flawed

standard

of

review

Corpus based upon

reasoning,

for

errant

denied

petitioner

Constitutionally protected liberty rights of petitioning

for redress,

equal protection, and due process, under the law.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

Appellant on December 28, 1999, filed with the trial court a Complaint
and Petition for an Article I, Section 5, Utah Constitution, Writ of
Habeas

Corpus, along

with

accompanying

Administrative

Notice

Process, and a blank Writ of Habeas Corpus to be issued.
contained

complaints

that

two

County

ordinances,

Appellant, were in violation of Appellants' liberty

when

of

Due

The Petition
applied

right(s)

to

secured

5
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under the State Constitution; and after having suffered for a term of
time, sought to challenge the legality of the ordinances.

Appellant

discovered

and

asked

the

court

to

interlineate

two

typographical corrections; but was informed to file a pleading for the
corrections.

Appellant was told, by Clerk of the Court, the judge had

set the petition aside, "because

he was going

to have

to do

research."

Appellant revisited Clerk of Court on January 5, 2000, and learned the
judge ordered her to make a copy of the file so personal research of the
Petition could be performed while away from court.

Appellant filed an amended Administrative Notice with the Clerk of the
Court on January 7, 2000, and asked to have it faxed to the judge so the
judge would be aware of the numerous examples and court cites for due
process and the issuance of the Writ of Habeas Corpus.

On January 10, 2000, Appellant filed with the trial Court, a Notice of
the Court's Refusal to Issue Habeas Corpus by Neglect.

On January 11, 2000, a ruling was entered by the Court, which appeared
to

address

only

one

of

two

issues

of

restraint,

and

in

which

the

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law were intertwined in a confusing
manner.

The trial court's findings, decipherable at best, were:

1. Relief by Habeas Corpus is not available where relief is otherwise
available;
2. It is a general prerequisite, in both Common Law and Equity (Rule
65B of Utah Rules of Civil Procedure) , was that petitioner be
restrained by commitment;
3. And there must exist a case in controversy, which affects the
parties (presumably the petitioner) rights.

6
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And the trial court's Conclusions of Law stated:

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Appellant presented no case in controversy;
Had not exhausted all available remedies;
Insufficient setting forth facts for prima facie case;
No controversy alleged
And, therefore the Petition was frivolous.

Petition was dismissed by court as frivolous, and notice of appeal filed
by Appellant.

On March 6, 2000, notice was given by the Utah Supreme

Court the case had been transferred from the Utah Court of Appeals
Appellant seeks review and challenges:

(1) the trial Court's findings

of facts; and, (2) the trial Court's conclusions of Law; (3) dismissal
of Petition on the grounds of being frivolous.

STATEMENT OF ISSUE

Whether

trial

court,

by

using

erroneous

findings

of

fact(s)

and

inappropriately applied law, imposed an incorrect standard of judicial
review

for sufficiency

of

Petition

for Writ

of Habeas

Corpus; and,

thereby denied petitioner Constitutionally protected liberty rights of
petitioning for redress, equal protection, and due process, under the
law.

STATEMENT OF STANDARD OR SCOPE OF REVIEW

The trial court's interpretation of Constitution, statutes, rules, and
ordinances is a question of law, and is plenarily
rectness

(State

v.

Larsen,

reviewed

for cor-

865 P.2d 1355, 1357 (Utah 1993)), giving no

7
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deference to t r i a l
fact(s)

court's conclusions.

The t r i a l

court's

findings

of

a r e reviewable for c o r r e c t n e s s .

ARGUMENT

I.

Did the District Court commit clear and reversible error by applying
an incorrect standard of review to Petition for Writ of Habeas
Corpus?

A:

Without violating
due process
or equal protection
of
the law, may the District
Court either
disregard
Higher Court rulings
or general principles
of law,
and substitute
its
own standard
for review
of a
Petition
for Habeas Corpus to deny relief
under the
guise of being
frivolous?
1
(A)

The trial Court's
available

where

finding of fact that "Relief by Habeas Corpus is not
relief

accurate statement.
sentence, must

is

otherwise

available"

is

only

a

somewhat

Granted, under United States Code, one attacking a

first move trial

court to set aside or appeal

a

denial

(28 U.S.C. 2 2 5 5 ) ; but the availability of other remedies does not

serve

generally

other

matters

bar

(Ex Parte

(1938)).
or

to

issuance
Kuney,

of

Habeas

5 NYS.2d

Corpus

to

a

petitioner

in

644; affd, 280 NY 794; 21 NE.2d

The attributes of having to first file a motion to set

appeal

is

not

applicable

to

the

facts

of

case

instant,

as

621

aside
case

instant is not a case of having been convicted and sentenced, but a case
about denial of services deemed to be necessities of life by

imposition

of a county ordinance.

Although Ex
and

logical

Parte

Kuney

argument

is not a Utah state case, a reasoned,
can

be

made

that

the

Constitutional

rational
rights,

8
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privileges or immunities found and protected by the highest court in any
state are unenumerated rights, privileges and immunities in any other
state.

In Utah, visa via, the Constitution of the United States is the

Supreme law of the land,

(Article I, Section 3 ) ; all enumerated and

unenumerated rights of the Federal Constitution

(Amendment IX) are, at

least, unenumerated rights in Utah (Article I, Section 25); and are, by
definition,

fundamental

principles

essential

to

the

security

of

individual rights (Article I, Section 27); to be mandatorily protected,
unless expressly declared otherwise

Official
for

Proceedings

the

State

of

of this section).

and Debates

Utah

(Article I, Section 26; see also,

of the Convention

for

the

Constitution

(1895), Volume 1, page 360, for original meaning

Thus any constitutional or judicial right, privilege

or immunity created in any other state, by the same application is, at
least, an unenumerated

right, privilege or immunity of the people of

Utah, to be protected by any officer of the state who has an oath of
office swearing, to support, obey and defend the Constitution of the
United States

[of America] and the Constitution of this State, and to

discharge their duties with fidelity

(Article IV, Section 10) .

Hence,

if it is a general principle in a sister state that availability of
other

remedy does not bar Habeas, then it is well

to be

a general

principle in Utah; and if in Utah, then binding on the Eighth District.

(B)

The petitioning
Affidavit
therein,
correctly

9/5/00

for a Writ

attesting
by

either

states

in

to

the

of Habeas

truthfulness

first-hand
two

requires

knowledge

different

of
or

the attachment

the

statement

belief.

locations

of

The

having

of an

contained
Petition
exhausted

9
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administrative
affirmative

remedy.

Yet the trial

representation"

of

court, admitting

administrative

remedies

there is "an
having

been

exhausted, immediately denies the presumption of law that statements of
an affidavit are to be considered

true unless

or until

refuted; and

found "the facts [alleged] do not suggest that such is the case."
facts?

What

The record reflects no facts refuting the affidavit—unless they

were imaginary facts—introduced improperly by the trial court, to the
trial court.

The United States Supreme Court, in Moore

v. East

Cleveland

(431 US 494,

497, fn. 5 (1977)}, when expounding on the principle of exhaustion, said
that it

[exhaustion] would never

foreclose a criminal defendant

from

asserting constitutional invalidity of the statute under which defendant
was being prosecuted [or restrained].

By the same reasoning, a parallel

argument may be made relating to "asserting constitutional invalidity"
of an ordinance by which

one

is being

restrained.

Both

constitute

challenges of constitutionality, if one is acceptable, then so must the
other.

Plain, Speedy and adequate remedy are:
SPEEDY REMEDY:
involved,
essential

District
Yellowstone

One which, having in mind the subject-matter
can be pursued with expedition and without
detriment to the party aggrieved
(State
v.

Court

of

County,

Thirteenth

Judicial

District

In

and

for

50 Mont 289; 146 P. 743, 745).

ADEQUATE: Sufficient; proportionate; equally efficient; equal to
what is required; suitable to the case or occasion;
satisfactory (Nagle v. City of Billings,
11 Mont 205; 250 P.
445, 446). Equal to some given occasion or work {Nissen
v.
Miller,
44 NM 487; 105 P.2d 324, 326). Commensurate; it
does not mean average or graduation (Vandermade
v.
Appert,
125 NJ.Eq 366; 5 A.2d 868, 871).
ADEQUATE REMEDY: One vested in the complainant, to which he may
at all times resort at his own option, fully and freely,
10
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without let or hindrance {Wheeler
v. Bedford,
54 Conn 244; 7
A 22; State
ex rel Heirnov
v, Thomson,
131 Conn 8; 37 A. 2d
689, 692.
Suitable, proportionate, or sufficient
{Fischer
v. Damm, 36 Ohio App. 515; 173 NE 449, 451). A remedy which
is plain and complete and as practical and efficient to the
ends of justice and its prompt administration as the remedy
in equity (Farmers
& Traders
Bank v. Kendrick,
341 Mo 571;
108 SW.2d 62, 64) . A remedy that affords complete relief
with reference to the particular matter in controversy, and
is appropriate to the circumstances of the case {State
v.
A remedy to be
Huwe, 103 Ohio 546; 134 NE 456, 459) .
adequate, precluding resort to mandamus, must not only be
one placing relator in status quo, but must itself enforce
in some way performance of the particular duty {State
v.
Erickson,
104 Conn 542, 133 A 683, 686); must reach end
intended, and actually compel performance of duty in
question {Buchanan v. Buchanan,
124 Va 255; 6 SE.2d 612,
620).
Must be plain, accurate, certain, speedy, specific,
and appropriate to the particular circumstances, and must
also be equally as convenient, beneficial, and effective
{Simpson
v. Williams
Rural High School
Dist.,
Tex.Civ.App.;
153 SW.2d 852, 856).

The

definitions

adequate

speak

remedy,

for

(1) the

themselves.
complainant

To
has

have

to be

plain,
able

speedy

resort

and

to

the

remedy, at his own option, fully and freely; (2) remedy can be pursued
with expedition and without essential detriment to the party aggrieved;
(3)

is

sufficient,

required;

proportionate,

efficient,

and

equal

to

what

is

(4) is plain, complete, and practical in support of justice

and its prompt administration;

(5) without resorting to extra-ordinary

measures; (6) places the relator in status quo.

The trial Court correctly found issuance of the Writ is dependent upon
there being "no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy."

Clearly, any restraint of liberty imposed, without recourse as would be
imposed by sustaining of the trial court's ruling, can have no plain,
nor speedy, nor adequate remedy—effectively no remedy at all, if the
restraint

9/5/00

(and

restraining

party)

can

not

be

challenged,

even

with

11
Appellant Brief

extra-ordinary measures.

Thus the trial court erred in the presumption that "petitioner seeks a
remedy which is contrary to the law;" as the "law is made to prevent the
stronger from having the power to everything" (Common Law Maxim, Davies'
Reports, Irish King's Bench), and "an act of law shall prejudice no man"
(II Institutes, Coke on Magna Charta and Old Acts); as the "law" can not
bar constitutional challenges.

2.

The trial Court's finding of, "It is a general prerequisite, in Common
Law

that

petitioner

statement of judicial
Clarkson,

be

restrained

fact.

As

by

commitment"

is

an

incorrect

far back in history as 1722

{R.

v.

93 Eng. Rep. 625) it was not required to show the person to be

produced by a Habeas to be physically confined by a jailer, much less by
commitment.
Bridgeman

et

As noted in the Administrative Notice, again in 1841 {R. v.
al.,

174 Eng. Rep. 503) it is demonstrated that physical

custody, by commitment or not, was not required, but it was sufficient
to show an individual was not at liberty to go where they pleased.

And

yet again, in the Notice, it is pointed out, that in 1973, the United
States Supreme Court announced one "only need be subject to a restraint
not shared by the public in general" (Hensley

v. Municipal

Court,

411 US

345, 351, fn. 8 ) . Having been noticed and in possession of cites, it is
clear the trial was made fully aware of these cases.

Additionally, the

United States Supreme Court articulated the following analysis:

History, usage, and precedent can leave no doubt that
besides physical imprisonment (emphasis added), there
12
9/5/00
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are other restraints (emphasis added) on a man's liberty,
restraints not shared by the public generally, which have
been thought sufficient in the English-speaking world to
support the issuance of Habeas Corpus
restrain[t of]
petitioner's liberty to do those things which in this
country free men are entitled to do. Such restraints are
enough to invoke the help of the "Great Writ'7 (emphasis
added){Jones v. Cunningham,
371 US 236, 240 (1963)).
These cases, from 200 years ago to the present, are in diametric
opposition to the findings of the trial court; and those cases from
the United States Supreme Court are the standards to which all Judges
are to adhere (Federal Constitution, Article VI, Section 2 ) , not the
pursuit of the trial court's private agenda.

Without violating
equal protection
or due process
of
the law, may the District
Court substitute
its own
more stringent
definitions
of
legal
terms
and
principles
of law to deny issuance
of a Writ of
Habeas Corpus under the guise
of being
frivolous
based upon the District
Court's new
definition?

Prima facie:
evidence of a fact, is in law sufficient to establish the
fact, unless rebutted.
A Law Dictionary Adapted To The Constitution And
Laws Of The United States Of America And Of The
Several
States
Of The American Union
With
References To The Civil And Other Systems Of
Foreign Law, by John Bouvier, Entered according
to Act of Congress, in the year one thousand
eight hundred and fifty-two, by Eliza Bouvier and
Robert E. Peterson, Trustees, in the Clerk's
Office of the District Court for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania.

Given the principle of law that statements in an affidavit are presumed
to be

true, unless

or

until

Petition, in affidavit form, is

refuted,

any

statement

or

claim

in a

prima facie evidence of the particular

13
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fact attested.

Perusal of the Petition, shows the Petition states a claim of restraint
of

constitutional

right to exercise

right

to life

and

right

and of

contract, by an ordinance which requires a building permit before one
can contract for utilities which are commonly and generally agreed upon
as necessities of life.
conditions

endured.

Continuing on, it states the life-threatening

The

conditions

and

would

attested

the

the

Petition

verifiable

restraint.

If the trial Court, sua sponte, determines one-half of a
a Petition

as

statement

were

physically

claim is false, when used to deny

support

in

claiming

frivolous, why not

determine the other half to be true which is favorable to issuance?

The principle espoused in Coffin
that

a petition

is not be

v. Reichared,

scrutinized

(143 F.2d 443, (1944)} is

with

technical

should liberally be applied; and the doctrine in Mallory
(391 US 917 (1967)) and Harris

v.

Nelson,

niceties, but
Follette,

v.

(394 US 286 (1969)) where it

is stated that Petitioners in Habeas proceedings are entitled careful
consideration

and plenary processing

of their

claims, including

full

opportunity for presentation of relevant facts, and only in this way is
both

the

petitioner

and

respondent

able

to

have

a

full

and

fair

opportunity to present their positions.

The trial Court's imposition, of it's new definition, that to be prima
facie, one has to add adjunctive facts, is contrary to each of these
doctrines in that it requires more than "a short, plain statement of the
facts on the basis of which the petitioner seeks relief (Utah Rules of
Civil

Procedure, Rule

65B

(3) ) .

How much more plain, and

without arguments or authorities, can one be than stating simply:

concise,
"I am

14
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restrained of my xxx and yyy constitutional rights and I have suffered
thus and such?"

2.

That some kind of restraint in action is required is a sound finding of
the trial court and in accordance with prevailing holdings of law.

The

question, then, is what is the standard for determining liberty, so one
may know when one is not at liberty, and is restrained?

The full text of the Constitutional definition of liberty, as defined in
Bouvier's Law Dictionary is:

LIBERTY. Freedom from restraint. The power of acting as one thinks
fit, without any restraint or control, except from the
laws of nature.
• Liberty is divided into civil, natural, personal, and
political.
• Civil liberty is the power to do whatever is permitted
by the constitution of the state and the laws of the
land. It is no other than natural liberty, so far
restrained by human laws, and no further, operating
equally upon all the citizens, as is necessary and
expedient for the general advantage of the public.
• Natural liberty is the right which nature gives to all
mankind, of disposing of their persons and property
after the manner they judge most consonant to their
happiness, on condition of their acting within the
limits of the law of nature, and that they do not in any
way abuse it to the prejudice of other men.
• Personal liberty is the independence of our actions of
all other will than our own. It consists in the power of
locomotion, of changing situation, or removing one's
person to whatever place one's inclination may direct,
without imprisonment or restraint, unless by due course
of law.
• Political liberty may be defined to be, the security by
which, from the constitution, form and nature of the
established
government,
the
citizens
enjoy
civil
liberty.
No
ideas
or
definitions
are
more
distinguishable than those of civil and political
liberty, yet they are generally confounded.
The
political liberty of a state is based upon those
9/5/00
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fundamental laws which establish the distribution of
legislative and executive powers. The political liberty
of a citizen is that tranquillity of mind, which is the
effect of an opinion that he is in perfect security; and
to insure this security, the government must be such
that one citizen shall not fear another.

This definition and the definition given in the Notice are in agreement
and

are quite different, when

read

as a whole, than the

definition

attempted to be imposed by the findings of the Court, where liberty does
not "envision that personal liberty would exempt individuals

from all

extraneous control or that a citizen has an unfettered right to follow
the dictates of his unrestricted choice," and then lists specific rights
in the Utah Constitution, of acquisition and enjoyment of property, of
protest against wrongs, of petitioning for redress
1 ) ; of contracts

(Article I, Section

(Article I, Section 18); of prosecuting and defending

civil causes (Article I, Section 11) as being too broad.

The trial court, in its pretextual extraction of the definition, in an
attempt

to

distort

the

intent

of

restrictive sentence that follows.

the

petition,

eliminated

the

That restrictive sentence states:

"'freedom to enjoy to the fullest extent the privileges and immunities
given or assured to the people living within the union of the united
States of America."

Clearly, text without context is pretext.

Black's Law Dictionary

(6th1 Edition

(1968)) defines liberty even more

broadly (a copy is attached in the appendix).

Incorrect Standard of Review —

The trial Court, by substituting

Conclusion

its own more stringent standards of

•16
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review

for

a

Petition

of

Habeas

Corpus

has

committed

clear

error,

violated due process and equal protection under the law: (1) either by
deliberating
Petition

distorting

law and

frivolous; or,

facts in its attempt

(2) by

the

Court

being

to declare

incompetent

and

the
not

empowered to enforce due process and equal protection.

II. Did the District Court commit reversible error by denying issuance
Writ of Habeas Corpus based upon falleous Conclusions of Law?

A: Without violating
due process
of law, may the Court,
lacking
foundation
in law, dismiss allegations
contained
in complaint
for
Petition
1.
Controversy arises when allegations are made, and cease when either, (a)
one party fails to answer, or

(b) controversy is heard by a finder of
In Alewine

facts and judgement entered.

v. Missouri,

(1975)), the Court held that "once a petitioner

(352 F.Supp, 1190
alleges he has been

denied constitutional rights, [the] government ... is subject to a heavy
burden

of

going

forward

to

prove

the

petitioner

knowingly,

intentionally, and voluntarily waived those rights."

In Ex Parte

Dillon,

(186 P 170, 172 (1919)), the Court held "the burden

of proof, of justifying the legality of detention or restraint is on the
public

servant

depriving

the

petitioner

of

his

liberty"

(emphasis

added).

The indicia of Alewine
controversy

clearly

constitutional rights.

v. Missouri
arises

upon

and Ex Parte
claim

of

Dillon,
denial

indicate that
[restraint]

of

This, in contradistinction to the findings of

the trial court that the petitioner complains of "the mere existence of
certain

county

ordinances;"

and

"has

not

presented

a

case

in

controversy," indicates the petitioner did raise a controversy with a
"mere"

allegation

of

denial

of

constitutional

rights

application of county ordinance violated Petitioner's

by

claiming

constitutionally

protected liberty.

9/5/00
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The trial court erroneously found that the Petition failed to set forth
facts

which

ordinance.

show

that

Under

petitioner

Section

has

II, page

be

4,

adversely

of

the

affected

Petition,

by

the

petitioner

clearly states the affect of restraint of liberty rights by imposition
of

the

ordinance

without

heat

continues

in

on,

temperatures

to

against
life

threatening

define

were —

petitioner

in

minus

caused

the

petitioner

temperatures.

footnote

1,

25 degrees

what

internal

And
the

to

the

life

live

Petition

threatening

to the structure

and

minus 39 degree externally.

It doesn't matter whether there is one or a hundred facts to support
allegations

or

affects,

notwithstanding;
constitutional
restraint,

is

and

allegations
rights,

the
of

supported

a prima

facie

case

findings

claim
by

of

of
denial

claims

which

the

of

would

affects

entitle
v.

court

[restraint]

the

remedy and is in harmony with the finding of Alewine

Parte

trial

of
from

petitioner
Missouri

to

and Ex

Dillon.
2.

According

to

Urquhart

v.

Lockhart,

(726

F.2d

1316

(1984)

a

Habeas

Petition may not be dismissed, unless it appears beyond doubt that the
petitioner can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would
entitle him to relief.

Sua

sponte investigation, by the trial court, of only

favor of one of the parties
process.

references

in

to a suit is a clear violation of due

The trial Court admits researching the "ordinances" but does

not state it researched

the temperatures

asserted

in support

of the

effects of the alleged restraint (and by its own logic, it must not have
done

any

research) .

The

claim

of

the

temperatures, if

the

wanted, could have been as easily verified as the ordinances.

trial

But the

rather, the trial Court denied the petition based partly, upon failure
of "show[ing] that he had been adversely affected by an ordinance."

In the spirit of the holding in Harris
the

"petitioners

in

Habeas

v.

proceedings

plenary processing of their claims."

Nelson,
are

(394 US 286

entitled

to

(1969))

careful

and

The trial Court, in sua sponte
18
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investigation of one thing and avoiding investigation of another, is in
clear violation of due process for review of sufficiency.

Even granting the trial Court applied Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
Rule

65B,

(applying

equity,

to

a

common

law

petition);

the

rule

prohibits arguments and citations, but requires a short plain statement
of the facts.

How much more plain can a statement of fact be, than

"restraint by A, caused B affect," as in the Petition?

Incorrect Application of Law —

Conclusion

The trial Court, by applying its own derivative of law in review of a
Petition of Habeas Corpus, has committed clear error by violating due
process

and equal protection

distorting

law

and

facts

under

in

its

the law:
attempt

(1) either

to

declare

deliberating
the

Petition

frivolous to forward its own agenda; or, (2) the Court is incompetent
and fails in its duty to enforce due process and equal protection.

CONCLUSION

The fundamental principle of fairness requires consistent application of
accepted principles and rules of law.
of law.
and

This principle is called the rule

Strict adherence to the established procedures is due process

affords

equal

introduction

of

protection

variations

and

under

the

law;

deviations,

and

however

precludes
small,

the

lacking

exigent circumstances.

Once having introduced unwarranted variations and deviations, violation
of due process and equal protection occurs.

It is the duty of citizens

and of the Courts to guard against the stealthy encroachment of rights
(Boyd

v. United

States,

116 US 616 (1886)), by violations of due process

and equal protection, which if left unchallenged and unchecked, leads to
the

common

denial

of

the

exercise

of

those

rights

and

to

eventual

extinction of what was once a secured right.

Aside from the Common Law, the Legislatures (Federal and State) and the
Judicial Rules Committees have established a balwark for review of a
19
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Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus.

Such is Rule 65B; and such are

the variations and deviations introduced in the case instant that it is
to guard against.

1.
The following is a side-by-side representation of the standard of review
asserted by the trial Court, the standard set by Rule 65B, and even
though

the

Petitioner

acted

under

the Common

Law,

claiming

right a

Constitutional Habeas Corpus, the Petitioner's actions to the standard
set in Rule 65B.

COMPARISON OF STANDARDS OF "ON ITS FACE" REVIEW OF A PETITION FOR WRIT
OF HABEAS CORPUS AS LISTED IN RULE 65B

| Trial

Court

Standard

Rule

65B

Standard

Petitioner's

Action

Prima facie case;
retaining judicial
ability to deny
truthfulness of
selected statements
without facts before
the court.

A short, plain
statement of fact on
the basis of which the
petitioner seeks
relief; attested to by
oath and presumed to
be true.

Full pleading

No argument or
authorities in
petition, but in
memorandum

Administrative Notice
(for issuance of Writ,
but not the facts of
restraint)

Identify Respondent(s)

Petition

Identify place of
restraint

Petition

Pretense of restraint,
if known by petitioner

Petition, restraint by
ordinance

Prior adjudicative
proceedings, with copy

Petition

Denies restraint
except physical
restraint by
commitment

Petition, a short
plain statement of
fact in affidavit

20
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Trial

Court

Rule

Standard

65B

Standard

If frivolous on face ...
forthwith issue order
of dismissal ... and
reason (obvious
frivolousness is
readily apparent)

8 days research and
delay by the Court

Petitioner's

Action

\

Demand of issuance of
Writ
after
12
days
delay

Based on the above comparison, the ruling of the trial Court is not in
accordance with equity Rule 65B(5) by neglecting when "any claim in the
petition

shall

appear

to be

frivolous

on its

face, the court

shall

forthwith issue an order dismissing the claim ... and the reasons."

As

the record reflects, the trial Court, not forthwith, issued a ruling
stating,

"Based

on

the

above,

the

petition

is

dismissed

as

being

frivolous."

And arriving at such a conclusion, apparently to the trial Court, "being
frivolous on its face," clearly means, entails, and requires eight (8)
days extra-judicial research before discovery and determination.

2.
The following is a side-by-side representation of the application of law
as asserted by the trial Court and the standard set by other Judicial
Authority.

The Chart speaks for itself.

COMPARISON OF STANDARDS OF LAW APPLICABLE TO REVIEW OF PETITION
FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

Trial

Court

Standard

Court's prerequisite
restraint by commitment;
I application for Writ prior
incarceration considered
| premature

9/5/00

Correct

Standard

In 1722, not required to be to be
physically restrained; In 1841
sufficient to show an individual
was not at liberty to go where they
pleased; In 1973, the United States
Supreme Court announcement "only
need be subject to a restraint not
shared by the public in general";
Such restraint is enough to invoke
Appellant Brief

Trial

Court

Standard

Correct

Standard

the help of the Great Writ

1

Plead prima facie case,
Court can deny any fact by
fiat, or by cunning
distortions of facts
presented

Affidavit is acceptable evidence; \
Evidence of a fact, is sufficient
to establish the fact, unless
rebutted by facts of equal weight;
Petition not dismissed, unless it !
appears beyond doubt that no set of i
facts can be proved in support
which would entitle relief; Plenary
processing; Not be scrutinized with
technical niceties, but liberally
applied

Mere existence of ordinance
is not controversy

Once allegation of denied of
constitutional right, [the]
government ... is subject to a
heavy burden of going forward to
prove knowingly, intentional, and
voluntarily waiver of rights;

Once alleges denial of
constitutional rights, [the]
government ... is subject to a
heavy burden of going forward to
prove knowing, intentional, and
voluntary waiver; those rights;
Petition for Redress of grievances;
Frequent recurrence to fundamental
principles for security of rights

Challenge of
Constitutionally is not
permitted — by law

Based

upon

the

foregoing,

attending Administrative
Habeas

Corpus, imposed

it

appears

Notice

the

filed with

an incorrect

trial
the

standard

of

did

not

Petition

read

the

for Writ of

judicial

review

for

sufficiency of Petition, and applied inappropriate rendering of law for
Petition

for Writ

of

Habeas

Corpus; and,

thereby

denied

Constitutionally protected liberty rights of petitioning
equal protection, and due process, under the law.

Petitioner

for redress,

Therefore the Supreme

Court should reverse the ruling of the trial Court and remand the case

22
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back to the trial Court.
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Black's Law Dictionary 6th Ed (1968)
LIBERTY. Freedom; exemption from extraneous control.
Freedom
from all restraints except such as are Justly Imposed by law. Ex
parte Kreutzer, 187 Wis. 463, 204 N.W. 595, 604. Freedom from
restraint, under conditions essential to the equal enjoyment of
the same right by others; freedom regulated by law, Kelly v.
James, 37 S.D. 272, 157 N.W. 990, 991. The absence of arbitrary
restraint, not
Immunity
from reasonable
regulations
and
prohibitions Imposed In the Interests of the community. Southern
Utilities Co. v. City of Palatka, 86 Fla. 583, 99 So. 236, 240;
Nelson v. Tllley, 137 Neb. 327, 289 N.W. 388, 392, 126 A.L.R.
729; Arnold v. Board of Barber Examiners, 45 N.M. 57, 109 P. 2d
779, 785.
The power of the will to follow the dictates of Its unrestricted
choice, and to direct the external acts of the Individual without
restraint, coercion, or control from other persons. See Booth v.
Illinois, 22 S.Ct. 425, 184 U.S. 425, 46 L.Ed. 623; Munn v.
Illinois, 94 U.S. 142, 24 L.Bd. 77; People v. Warden of City
Prison, 51 N.E. 1006, 157 N.Y. 116, 43 L.R.A. 264, 68 Am.StRep.
763.
The word "liberty" Includes and comprehends all personal rights
and their enjoyment. Rosenblum v. Rosenblum, 42 N.Y.S.2d 62 6,
630, 181 Misc. 78. It embraces freedom from duress, In re Miner.
D.C. III., 9 F.Supp, 1, 7; freedom from governmental Interference
In exercise of Intellect, In formation of opinions, In the
expression of them, and in action or Inaction dictated by
Judgment, Zavilla v. Masse, 112 Colo. 183, 147 P.2d 823, 827;
freedom from servitude, Imprisonment or restraint, Committee tor
Industrial Organization v. Hague, D.C.N.J., 25 F.Supp. 127, 131,
141; People v. Wood, 272 N.Y.S. 258, 151 Misc. 66: freedom in
enjoyment and use of all of one's powers, faculties and property,
Grosjean v. American Press Co., La., 56 S.Ct. 444, 446, 297 U.S.
233, 80 L.Ed. 660; City of Mt. Vernon v.
Julian,
369 III.
447, 17 N.E.2d 52, 55, 119 A.L.R. 747; freedom of assembly,
Rosenblum v. Rosenblum, 42 N.Y.S. 2d 626, 630, 181 Misc. 78;
freedom of citizen from banishment, Committee for Industrial
Organization v. Hague, D. C.N.J., 25 F.Supp. 127, 141; freedom of
conscience, Gobitis v. Minersville School Dist., D.C.Pa.,
21
F.Supp. 581, 58 4, 587; freedom of contract, State ex rel. Hamby
v, Cummings, 166 Tenn. 460, 63 S.W.2d 515; State v. Henry, 37
N.M. 536, 25 P.2d 204, 90 A.L.R. 805; freedom of locomotion or
movement, Commonwealth v. Doe, 109 Pa. Super. 187, 167 A. 241,
242; Committee for Industrial Organization v. Hague, D. C.N.J.,
25 F.Supp. 127, 131, 141;
freedom of occupation, Koos v.
Saunders, 349 HI. 442, 182 N.E. 415, 418; freedom of press,
:ommonwealth v. Nichols, 301 Mass. 584, 18 N.E.2d 166, 167; Near
J. State of Minnesota ex rel. Olson (Minn.) 51 S.Ct. 625, 628,
283 U.S. 697, 75 L.Ed. 1357; freedom of religion, Gabrielli v.
Knickerbocker, 12 Cal.2d 85,
82 P.2d 391, 393; Hamilton v.
:ity of Montrose, 109 Colo. 228, 124 P.2d 757, 759; Cantwell v.
State of Connecticut, Conn., 60 S.Ct. 900, 903, SIO U.S. 29&, 84

L.Ed. 1213, 128 A.L.R. 1352;
freedom of speech, Ghadiall v.
Delaware State Medical Soc, D.C.Del., 28 F.Supp. 841, 844;
Carpenters and Joiners Union of America, Local No. 213, v.
Ritter's Cafe, Tex., 62 S.Ct. 807, 809, 315 U.S. 722, 86 L.Ed.
1143.
It also embraces right of self-defense against unlawful
violence, Rohrer v. Milk Control Board, 121 Pa. Super. 281. 184
A. 133, 136; right to acquire and enjoy property, Rohrer v. Milk
Control Board, 121 Pa. Super. 281, 184 A. 133, 136; right to
acquire useful knowledge, Rosenblum v. Rosenblum, 42 N.Y.S.2d
626, 630, 181 Misc. 78: right to carry on business, Mile, Reif,
Inc., v, Randau, I N.Y.S.2d 515, 518, 166 Misc. 247; right to
earn livelihood in any lawful calling.
Saidel v. Village of
Tupper Lake, 4 N.Y.S.2d 814, 818, 254 App.DIv. 22;
right to
emigrate, and If a citizen, to return, Committee for Industrial
Organization v. Hague, D. C.N.J., 25 F.Supp. 127, 141; right to
engage In a lawful business, to determine the price of one's
labor, and to fix the hours when one's place of business shall be
kept open, State Board of Barber Examiners v. Cloud, 220 Ind.
552, 44 N.E.2d 972, 980; right to enjoy to the fullest extent
the privileges and Immunities given or assured by law to people
living within the country, McGrew v. Industrial Commission, 96
Utah 203, 85 P.2d 608, 611; right to forswear allegiance and
expatriate oneself, Committee for Industrial Organization v.
Hague, D.C. N.J., 25 F.Supp. 127, 141; right to freely buy and
sell as others may, Rohrer v. Milk Control Board, 121 Pa. Super.
281, 184 A. 133, 136; right to labor, Simon v. Schwachman, 301
Mass. 573, 18 N.E. 2d 1, 3; right to live and work where one will.
People v. Wood, 272 N.Y.S. 258. 151 Misc. 66; right to marry and
have a family. Committee tor Industrial Organization v. Hague,
D.C.N. J., 25 F.Supp. 127, 141; Rosenblum v. Rosenblum, 42
N.Y.S.2d 626, 630, 181 Misc. 78; right to pursue chosen calling.
State v. Chlsesi, 187 La. 675, 175 So. 453; People v. Cohen, 8
N.Y.S.2d 70, 72, 255 App.DIv. 485;
right to use property
according owner's will,
State Bank & Trust Co. v. Village of
Wllmette, 358 III. 311, 193 N.E. 131, 133, 96 A.L.R. 1327.
Liberty, on Its positive side, denotes the fullness of Individual
existence;
on Its negative side it denotes the necessary
restraint on all, which Is needed to promote the greatest
Amos, Science of Law,
possible amount of liberty for each.
p. 90.
The word "liberty" as used In the state and federal Constitutions
means. In a negative sense, freedom from restraint, but In a
positive sense, It Involves the idea of freedom secured by the
imposition of restraint, and it is In this positive sense that
the state. In the exercise of Its police powers, promotes the
freedom of all by the Imposition upon particular persons of
restraints which are deemed necessary for the general welfare.
Fitzsimmons v. New York State Athletic Commission, Sup., 146
N.Y.S. 117, 121.
"Liberty,"
restraint,
Individual

In so far as It is noticed by government, Is
rather than license.
It Is a yielding of the
will to that of the many, subject to such

constitutional guarantees or limitations as will preserve
those rights and privileges which are admitted of all men to be
fundamental.
"Liberty" In the civil state is a giving up of
natural right In consideration of equal protection and
opportunity. Weber v. Doust, 84 Wash. 330, 146 P. 623, 625.
The "personal liberty" guaranteed by Const. U. S. Amend. 13
consists In the power of locomotion without Imprisonment or
restraint unless by due course of law, except those restraints
Imposed to prevent commission of threatened crime or In
punishment of crime committed, those In punishment of contempts
of courts or legislative bodies or to render their Jurisdiction
effectual, and those necessary to enforce the duty citizens owe
In defense of the state to protect community against acts of
those who by reason of mental Infirmity are Incapable of selfcontrol. Ex parte Hudgins, 86 W.Va. 526, 103 S.E. 327, 329, 9
A.L.R. 1361.
The "liberty" safeguarded by Fourteenth Amendment Is liberty In a
social organization which requires the protection of law against
the evils which menace the health, safety, morals, and welfare
of the people.
West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, Wash., 57 S.Ct.
578, 581, 582, 300 U.S. 379, 81 L.Ed. 703, 108 A.L.R. 1330.
Also, a franchise or personal privilege, being some part of the
sovereign power, vested in an individual, either by grant or
prescription.

making and administration of the laws, as the best apparatus
to secure that protection. Lieber, Civ.Lib. 24.
Liberty of Contract
The ability at will, to make or abstain from making, a binding
obligation enforced by the sanctions at the law. Judson,
Liberty of Contract, Rep. Am. Bar Ass'n (1891) 233.
The right to contract about one's affairs, Including the right
to make contracts of employment, and to obtain the best terms
one can as the result of private bargaining. Adkins v.
Children's Hospital of District of Columbia, 43 S. Ct. 394,
396, 261 U.S. 525, 67 L.Ed. 785, 24 A.L.R. 1238. It Includes
the corresponding right to accept a contract proposed.
St.
Louis Southwestern Ry, Co. of Texas v. Griffin, 106 Tex. 477,
171 S.W. 703, 704, L.R.A. 1917B, 1108. There is, however, no
absolute freedom of contract.
The government may regulate or
forbid any contract reasonably calculated to affect Injuriously
public Interest.
Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Riverside
Mills, 31 S.Ct. 164, 219 U.S. 186, 55 L.Ed. 167, 31
L.R.A..N.S., 7;
Carleton Screw Products Co. v. Fleming,
CCA.Minn., 126 F.2d 537, 541.
It means freedom from
arbitrary or unreasonable restraint, not immunity from
reasonable regulation to safeguard public Interest, Saucier v.
Life & Casualty Ins. Co. of Tennessee, 189 Miss. 693, 198 So.
625, 631; or the right to make contracts with competent persons
on a plane of relative parity or freedom of choice and within
the limits allowed or not forbidden by law.
McGrew v.
Industrial Commission, 96 Utah 203, 85 P.2d 608, 612.

The term Is used In the expression, rights, liberties, and
franchises, as a word of the same general class and meaning with
those words and privileges. This use of the term is said to have
been strictly conformable to Its sense as used In Magna Charta
and In English declarations of rights, statutes, grants, etc.; Natural Liberty
Corn. v. Alger, 7 Cush. (Mass.) 70.
The power of acting as one thinks fit, without any restraint or
control, unless by the law of nature. I Bl. Comm. 125.
In a derivative sense, the place, district, or boundaries within
which a special franchise is enjoyed, an immunity claimed, or a
The right which nature gives to all mankind of disposing of
jurisdiction exercised. In this sense, the term is commonly used
their persons and property after the manner they Judge most
in the plural; as the "liberties of the city."
consistent with their happiness, on condition of their acting
within the limits of the law of nature, and so as not to
Civil Liberty
Interfere with an equal exercise of the same rights by other
The liberty of a member of society, being a man's natural
men. Burlamaqui, c. 3, §15; I Bl. Comm. 125. It Is called by
liberty, so far restrained by human laws (and no further) as is
Lieber social liberty, and Is defined as the protection or
necessary and expedient for the general advantage of the
unrestrained action In as high a degree as the same claim of
public. I Bl. Comm. 125; 2 Steph. 487
protection of each Individual admits of.
The power of doing whatever the laws permit. I Bl. Comm. 6;
Inst. 1, 3, 1. See Dennis v. Moses, 18 Wash. 537, 52 P. 333,
40 L.R.A. 302. The greatest amount of absolute liberty which
can, In the nature of things, be equally possessed by every
citizen
In
a
state.
Guarantied
protection
against
Interference with the Interests and rights held dear and
Important by large classes of civilized men, or by all the
members of a state, together with an effectual share In the

Personal Liberty
The right or power of locomotion; of changing situation, or
moving one's person to whatsoever place one's own inclination
may direct, without imprisonment or restraint, unless by due
course of law. I Bl. Comm. 134. Civil Rights Cases, 3 S.Ct.
42, 109 U.S. 3, 27 L.Ed. 835; Pinkerton v. Verberg, 78 Mich.
573, 44 N.W. 579, 7 L.R.A. 507, 18 Am.StRep. 473.

olitical Liberty
Liberty of the citizen to participate In the operations of
government, and particularly In the making and administration
of the laws.
eligious Liberty
Freedom from dictation, constraint, or control in matters
affecting the conscience, religious beliefs, and the practice
of religion; freedom to entertain and express any or no system
of religious opinions, and to engage in or refrain from any
form of religious observance or public or private religious
worship, not inconsistent with the peace and good order of
society and the general welfare. See Frazee's Case, 63 Mich.
396, 30 N.W. 72, 6 Arn-StRep. 310/ State v. White, 64 N.H. 48,
5 A. 828.
LIBEBUM EST CUIQUE APUD SE EXPLOBABE AN EXPEDIAT SIBI CONSILIUM.
Every one is free to ascertain for himself whether a
recommendation is advantageous to his interest. Upton v. Vail, 6
Johns. (N.Y.) 181, 184, 5 Am.Dec. 210.

